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Edited by Noah Shachtman | Contact

Raptor ... or Turkey? (Final Part)

"If the United States is to maintain air dominance, it needs the [Lockheed Martin] F-22 [Raptor]," 1st Fighter Wing Captain Elizabeth Kreft said point-blank at the end of our Aug. 10 meeting.

The threat, Raptor advocates contend, is a dual one: the latest Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker derivate fighters and "double-digit" surface-to-air missile systems such as the S-300.

Su-27-Flanker.jpgUsers include:

S-300: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, Hungary, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Slovakia, Syria, Ukraine and Vietnam

Su-27/30/33: Angola, Armenia, Belarus, China, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuala (rumored) and Vietnam

Critics including fighter designer Pierre Sprey say the earlier generation of U.S. fighters such as the Lockheed Martin F-16 Viper and Boeing F-15 Eagle are adequate to defeat Flankers. Raptor friends point to exercises such as the infamous (and perhaps rigged) Cope India as evidence that the Viper and Eagle can be bested.

My own take: Sure, the F-15 and F-16 might be equal or even slightly superior (when pilot training, weapons and joint and industry support are considered). But for how long, in light of continued Flanker development? And since when is parity enough? Don't our pilots deserve better?

As for those S-300s ... The U.S. military has perhaps become accustomed to operating in permissive air defense environment such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Granted, helicopter pilots might not agree that these places are all that permissive. But there certainly is no real threat to the fast-movers and high-fliers that haul the cargo, spot targets and come to the rescue of pinned-down Marines. In this context, the Air Force has spent a decade mostly running down its Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses force; the Raptor promises to revitalize the capability and ensure global access for legacy aircraft and the future Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning.

Speaking of which, some critics ask, why can't we cut the expensive Raptor in favor of the cheaper Lightning? While a fine bomb-hauler and (one hopes) a good multi-service airframe, the F-35 is a mediocre performer. Said 1st Fighter Wing commander Brigadier General Burton Field, "The problem with the F-35 ... is speed. It doesn't have the capability to supercruise. Speed lets us get inside the decision cycle of the bad guy."

For the most dangerous air battles and attack missions, F-35 squadrons will rely on F-22s for support. That's an unavoidable state of affairs when you design an airframe to replace slow- and low-flying Lockheed Martin A-10 Warthogs and Boeing AV-8B Harriers as well as light and flexible F-16s and Boeing F/A-18 Hornets. The F-35 is a compromise. Potentially a very successful compromise, but still ...

We've already sunk $25 billion into Raptor development. That money is irrecoverable. Further jets cost only around $115 million (perhaps twice as much as a new F-16) and will get even cheaper. We should get a good return on our investment. A good return, in my estimation, means a full fleet of at least 381 Raptors in 10 or more full-strength squadrons. That should guarantee air dominance for another 30 years or more.

--David Axe

Latest Comments

Joe,

"UCAVs have been shown to be only about 20% less expensive than manned fighters for similar roles, "

That's the problem - they're trying to use them the same as old-style aircraft, not the sort of thing they are good at. If you built a robot F-22 it would have the same sort of limitations as the manned version.

"PERSISTENCE is their greatest asset not cost. "

Agreed it's important, but it's one of several. Expendability - the fact that is's not a political problem if one goes down is also major.


"If you're thinking of "massed UCAVs" that can take on enemy aircraft or air defenses, I think that's a fantasy... if we can't buy that many fighters now, we won't be able to buy that many UCAVs either. And even against low-end MQ-9 Predator B UCAVs at $8-9 million each, "

I'm thinking of MUCH cheaper UCAVs, like the Boeing Air Dominator or the Northrop Killer Bee, where you're talking less than $100k per unit.

The JITSA concept which I looked at a few months back - http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002309.html - envisages 600 of them being unleashed at a time.

Posted by: David Hambling at August 22, 2006 2:36 PM


Brian,

"I do have doubts that UAVs will ever be able to distinguish a Humvee from a cow."

I think you're a few generations behind in machine vision!

"Our servers just crashed this morning at work, so maybe I'm biased at the moment."

That will hit complex systems like the F-22 at least as badly as UCAVs.

"I know you've got images in your head of robot drones flying around like that scene in Terminator."

Big, awkward, vulnerable craft with limited sensors...no, nothing like that.

"I doubt any foreign power will muster a large enough or advanced enough force of UAVs to realistically fight the US."

Insurgents could start using them against US forces tomorrow.

"The UAV won't replace manned jets, it will supplement them."

Dream on.

"Also, the more capable you make a UAV, the more expensive it will be. If it has the abilities of an F-22, it will cost the same as an F-22."

No, for a lot of reasons. The simplest of which is man-rating: UCAVs simply don't have to be as safe and reliable as manned craft.
And when is a human-piloted F-22 going to be able to fly 72-hour missions without blinking once?

"Finally, I know we're not going to go back to tactics like the fire-bombing of Dresden. However, my point was, that is the ONLY way to truly break an insurgency"

Remember, appalling as it was, the fire-bombing of Dresden did not break German morale. Against guerillas, massive force did not work for the Soviets in Afghanistan, and it did not work in Chechnya. It also, most tellingly, did not work for Saddam Hussein: given external support, insurgents will go on fighting whatever you throw at them. And the more civilians you kill, the more popular their cause becomes.

Posted by: David Hambling at August 22, 2006 2:30 PM


The problem with the insurgency is this. There are a few thousand insurgents. They look just like everybody else in Iraq. They smile and wave at our troops when we drive by. They go to work in the morning, come home at night. They go to the bar to drink beer, and play "kick the sherpa" on Saturdays. Indistinguishable. They also pick up explosives from Crazy Ackbar, the local used car dealer. Then they go and blow things up. Then they go right back to waving at our troops and going to work in the morning.

So how do you catch these guys? Oh, some of the locals have a good idea who they are. When Abdul doesn't come home on Tuesday nights until after midnight, they know what he's doing. But he's "fighting the good fight". He's fighting the Americans, and some of them respect that. They're not gonna squeal, even when some fellow Iraqis get killed.

That's going to continue. It's going to continue until someone clamps down HARD on it. In Saddam's day, when something like this happened, he had everyone in the neighborhood shot. Neighbors become a whole lot less sympathetic when Abdul gets them all dead.

"Fear will keep the locals in line. Fear of this battlestation."

The US is a warm and fuzzy military. We're all happy and shiny and we don't kill innocents. Sadly, you can't describe many of the people in Iraq as "innocents". They're silently complicit.

Posted by: Brian at August 21, 2006 5:04 PM


This discussion just keeps just keeps on going, awesome.

We have an approximately 400 billion dollar defense budget (excluding supplemental), which as everyone knows is much larger than anybody else, even big bad China. This buys power projection and strategic options, not just typical self defense. No one is or will ever come close.

Yet, time and time again, we can't even wipe out some guerilla/insurgent force. So I ask, what is the correct balance between our desire for cool, and useless weapons systems and the things we actually use and need to "win" the wars we have now? We can't have it all.

High tech air superiority fighters, big expensive Cold War ships (excluding carriers) and submarines, ICBM’s, FCS, and Spy satellites (Russians, and Chinese of course); or better body armor, better small arms, better battlefield communications, real-time intelligence, more effective armored ground transportation, civil affairs/MP's/Peacekeepers, UCAV's, and IED/RPG/Sniper defense. Also, need more training for urban/asymmetric threats.

You tell me where the bulk of that $500 billion needs to go.

Posted by: WarNerd at August 21, 2006 4:15 PM


I believe we stand upon a very similar threshold that our grandparents did in the 1930's. They also didn't want to commit to upgrading the Air Force until Pearl Harbor.

Posted by: Jeff at August 21, 2006 2:43 PM


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